
















general	 term)	 and	 prejudices	 of	 various	 sorts.	 Because	 that	 discussion,	 I	 argue,	 justifies	 a	
psychoanalytic	 starting	 point,	 and	 since	 violence	 has	 become,	 almost	 quintessentially,	
masculine,	 this	 leads	on	to	an	exploration	of	what	can	be	 learnt	 from	psychoanalysis	about	
the	 relations	 among	 sexuality,	 masculinity,	 hatred	 and	 violence.	 This	 involves	 brief	
discussions	of	some	key	psychoanalytic	terms,	but	only	what	is	needed	to	enable	sense	to	be	








‘Hate‐motivated	violence’	 is	a	term	now	covered	by	a	huge	 literature.	 It	embraces	writings	on	
homophobia,	racial	violence,	anti‐semitism	and	violence	against	women,	to	name	the	four	most	
prominent	 ‘sub‐fields’,	 as	 well	 as	 many	 disciplines,	 especially	 sociology	 and	 psychology.	 The	
most	 ambitious	 attempt	 yet	 to	 synthesise	 this	 entire	 field	 is	 Elizabeth	 Young‐Bruehl’s	




aversive’	 (Young‐Bruehl	 1996:	 27,188).	 It	 ‘can	 be	 approached	 with	 comparatively	 simple	
psychological	 assumptions’	because	 it	 involves	 ‘real	groups’	with	 their	 associated	 ‘histories	…	
social	 traditions	 …	 economic	 habits	 and	 contexts	 …	 political	 structures’,	 and	 thus	 entails,	
primarily,	 ‘elaborate	 sociological	 work’	 (Young‐Bruehl	 1996:	 	 198‐9).	 ‘Ideologies	 of	 desire’	
(which,	 following	 the	 Greek	 word	 for	 desirous,	 she	 calls	 ‘orecticisms’),	 by	 contrast,	 are	







188).	 Studying	 such	 prejudices	 ‘initially	 demands	 a	 complex	 psychological	 description,	which	
must	precede	any	effort	to	follow	orecticists	into	public	domains	and,	then,	to	study	what	their	
meeting	with	 the	 public	 domain	means	 for	 them	 and	 they	 for	 it’	 (Young‐Bruehl	 1996:	 	 199).	
Within	this	framework,	anti‐Semitism,	racism,	sexism	and	the	homophobias	are	all	examples	of	
prejudices	 that	 are	 ‘in	 almost	 all	 their	 modern	 forms	 [that	 is,	 post	 1870]	 orecticisms,	 not	
ethnocentricisms’	(Young‐Bruehl	1996:		185).	It	is	the	focus	‘on	the	needs	and	desires	different	
prejudices	 fulfil’	 that	 explains	why	 her	 approach	must	 be	 initially	 ‘largely	 psychological’	 and	
‘rooted	 in	 psychoanalytic	 theory’,	 but	without	 neglecting	 the	 social:	 ‘it	 broadens	 into	 a	 social	
theory’	(Young‐Bruehl	1996:		27).		That	theory,	essentially,	is	that	particular	character	types	are	
associated	with	particular	 types	of	prejudice,	 and	 these	will	 be	 encouraged	or	discouraged	 in	
particular	types	of	societies.	
	
In	 earlier	 work	 drawing	 on	 this	 same	 research	 study	 of	 racism,	 I	 argued	 that	 there	 is	 an	






hatred	 (and	not	 simply	 racial	prejudice),	 an	approach	 that	must	 include	 the	 individual	hating	
subject,	 albeit	 in	 his	 or	 her	 social	 location.	 In	 some	 respects,	 this	 distinction	mirrors	 that	 of	
Young‐Bruehl’s	between	ethnocentrisms	(similar	to	my	idea	of	racial	prejudice)	and	ideologies	






women	 and	 femininity.	 Men’s	 relationships	 to	 women,	 forged	 originally	 in	 the	






its	 mother,	 the	 so‐called	 pre‐oedipal	 period,	 and	 the	 developmental	 task	 of	 separation.	 The	
trauma	 of	 birth	 leads	 to	 the	 separation	 of	 the	 baby	 from	 the	 oceanic	 oneness	 of	 the	 womb;	
thereafter,	from	perceiving	the	world	in	terms	of	part‐objects	(face,	breast,	and	so	on),	the	baby	
gradually	develops	the	ability	to	perceive	the	mother	as	a	whole	object,	separate	from	itself.	But	
there	 is	 nothing	 automatic	 about	 this	 and	 its	 achievement	 comes	 with	 varying	 degrees	 of	
success,	 for	 the	 trauma	 of	 separation	 at	 birth	 is	 followed	 by	 many	 other	 separations	 from	
womb‐like	pleasures:	the	breast	that	is	not	full	enough;	arrives	late,	accompanied	by	loud	noises	
or	bright	lights;	and	so	on.	In	response	to	such	denials	of	pleasure,	the	baby	phantasises	a	good	
breast/mother,	 when	 it	 feels	 full,	 contented,	 satisfied,	 and	 a	 bad	 breast/	 mother,	 when	 left	
feeling	hungry	or	insecure.	But	because	the	bad	phantasy	provokes	anxiety,	it	has	to	be	split	off	
and	located	elsewhere:	projected	into	another.	This	aggressive	forcing	of	parts	of	 the	self	 into	
another,	 usually	 the	 mother	 at	 this	 point,	 Klein	 eventually	 termed	 ‘projective	 identification’	
(often	 now	 used	 synonymously	 with	 ‘projection’,	 according	 to	 Hinshelwood	 1991:	 180).	







we	 shall	 see,	 at	 any	 time).	 These	 then	 are	 the	 first,	 primitive	 defences	 (which	 predate	
repression,	 the	 sequel	 to	 the	 oedipal	 complex	 that	 instantiates	 the	 unconscious,	 according	 to	
Freud).		
	
The	 task	 for	 the	 mother	 (a	 theoretical	 area	 importantly	 developed	 by	 post‐Kleinians	 like	
Winnicott	 and	Bion:	 see	Hinshelwood	1991),	who	will	be	a	primary	 recipient	of	 these	hostile	
projections,	 is	 to	 bear	 these	 hostile	 assaults	 without	 retaliation:	 to	 contain	 them	 and	 thus	
detoxify	them.	When	this	happens,	the	baby	gradually	learns	that	the	mother	is	not	simply	good	
or	bad,	 but	 sometimes	 good	 and	 sometimes	bad:	 that	 the	 source	 of	 love	 is	 also	 the	 source	of	
hate.	This	discovery	 is	accompanied	by	guilt	 for	 the	prior	hatred	and	a	 consequent	desire	 for	
reparation.	Once	this	point	is	reached	and	the	baby	is	able	to	‘self‐contain’,	as	it	were,	Klein	talks	
of	the	baby	entering	the	depressive	position.	This	too	is	not	a	once	and	for	all	achievement,	and	
it	 is	 also	 variably	 accomplished,	 depending,	 crucially,	 on	 the	 mother	 being	 a	 ‘good	 enough’	
container.	With	these	key	notions	–	splitting	and	projective	identification,	paranoid‐schizoid	and	
depressive	positions	–	Klein	revolutionised	our	understanding	of	 the	origins	of	 love	and	hate.	






…	 I	 suggest	 …	 that	 an	 equally	 fundamental	 component	 of	 male	 selfhood	 and	
identity	to	the	dynamic	of	male	as	not‐female	…	is	masculinity	as	being	an	adult	
male	 and	 not	 a	 little	 boy.	 Humiliation,	 specifically,	 is	 especially	 a	 male‐male	 –	
originally	father‐son	–	affair.	In	the	normal	developmental	course	of	events,	much	
hinges	 on	 how	 a	 boy	 relates	 to	 his	 father	 and	 turns	 into	 a	 man	 –	 the	 delicate	
negotiation	 of	 this	 transformation,	 of	 identification,	 of	 how	 to	 replace	 or	 join	
without	 bringing	 on	 retaliation,	 castration,	 or	 humiliation.	 All	 of	 these,	 in	 turn,	




theory	 of	 sexuality,	 with	 its	 (controversial	 at	 the	 time)	 discovery	 of	 infantile	 sexuality,	 its	
notions	 that	 everyone	 starts	 out	 (unconsciously)	 bisexual,	 that	 both	 heterosexual	 and	
homosexual	object	choice	are	developmentally	contingent,	and	that	 ‘perversions’	and	 ‘normal’	
sexuality	 exist	 on	 a	 continuum	 (Freud	 1905).	 Many	 of	 these	 ideas	 have,	 subsequently,	 ‘been	
elaborated,	 challenged	 and	 revised’	 (Chodorow	 2012:	 37),	 especially	 those	 to	 do	 with	 the	
dominant	 role	 given	 to	 the	penis	 (in	 female	 sexual	development)	 and	 to	 the	normalisation	of	












paranoid‐schizoid	 and	 depressive	 positions	 took	 over	 and	 she	 gradually	 stopped	 referring	 to	






whereby	boy	 children	 give	 up	 love	 of	 the	mother	 for	 identification	with	 the	 father	 under	 the	
threat	of	castration	has	gone	largely	unchallenged	–	until	feminist	relational	psychoanalysts	(a	




point,	 there	 does	 not	 need	 to	 be	 a	 sharp	 dis‐identification	 (with	 the	 feminine)	 during	 the	
Oedipal	process.	Rather,	she	suggests,	it	depends:	everything	is	contingent.	Crucially,	the	degree	
to	which	 feminine	identifications	are	given	up	in	favour	of	masculine	ones,	and	the	manner	 in	






[T]wo	 clinical	 complexes	 seem	 to	 me	 especially	 useful	 in	 thinking	 about	
terrorism	 and	 other	 extreme	 violence:	 first,	 paranoid‐schizoid	 splitting	 and	
projective	 identification	 and,	 second,	 narcissism	 and	 humiliation.	 (Chodorow	
2012:	126)	
	




the	 woman	 who	 nurses	 him	 –	 and	 in	 doing	 so	 we	 are	 postulating	 a	 primary	 narcissism	 in	
everyone’	 (Freud	 1914:	 81‐2).	 Although	 Chodorow	 (2012:	 36),	 I	 think	 correctly,	 finds	 this	
statement	problematic	since	it	elides	‘two	mutually	exclusive	claims,	sexual	pleasure	in	the	self,	
sexual	pleasure	in	the	mother’,	it	makes	sense	once	we	read	it	through	an	object	relations	lens	








Secondary	 narcissism	 occurs,	 for	 Freud,	 in	 those	 ‘whose	 libidinal	 development	 has	 suffered	
some	disturbance’	 (Freud	1914:	81).	Such	people,	 ‘in	 their	 later	choice	of	 love‐objects	…	have	
taken	as	a	model	not	their	mother	but	their	own	selves.	They	are	plainly	seeking	themselves	as	a	
love	 object,	 and	 are	 exhibiting	 a	 type	 of	 object‐choice	 which	 must	 be	 termed	 “narcissistic”’	
(Freud	1914)).	Once	again,	an	object	relations	lens	provides	a	more	satisfactory	account	of	the	
nature	of	these	‘disturbances’,	which	are	recast,	specifically,	as	difficulties	or	disappointments	in	
relating	 to	 love	 objects,	 as	 Christopher	 Lasch	 explains	 in	 his	 influential	 study	 of	 narcissism:	
‘Secondary	narcissism	…	“attempts	to	annul	the	pain	of	disappointed	[object]	love”	and	to	nullify	
the	child’s	rage	against	 those	who	do	not	 respond	 immediately	to	his	needs’	 (Lasch	1979:	36,	
quoting	 from	 Freeman	 1963:	 295).	 This	 is	 done	 by	 attempting	 ‘to	 re‐establish	 earlier	
relationships	 by	 creating	 in	 his	 fantasies	 an	 omnipotent	 mother	 or	 father	 who	 merges	 with	
images	of	his	own	self’	(Lasch	1979:	36)	and	which	can	then	be	used	‘to	annul	the	anxiety	and	












The	 two	 defences	 characteristic	 of	 Klein’s	 depressive	 position	 are	 denial	 and	
omnipotence.	These	are	less	violent	than	those	of	the	paranoid‐schizoid	position.	
Denial	 is	 primarily	 a	 denial	 of	 dependency	 (feelings	 of	 helplessness)	 and	
ambivalent	 feelings	 towards	 the	mother	…	Associated	with	 this	 is	omnipotence,	








Lasch	 also	 argues	 that	 secondary	 narcissism	 ‘has	 come	 to	 be	 recognised	 as	 an	 important	
element	 in	the	so‐called	character	disorders	that	have	absorbed	much	of	the	clinical	attention	
once	given	to	hysteria	and	obsessional	neuroses’	 (Lasch	1979:	36‐41).	Without	going	 into	 the	
features	of	such	‘character	disorders’	in	detail,	some	of	the	broad	characteristics	they	subsume,	
namely,	 ‘“chaotic	 and	 impulse‐ridden”’	 rather	 than	 ‘severely	 repressed	 and	 morally	 rigid’,	 a	








at	 her	 children	 for	not	doing	 as	 they	 are	 told,	 no	 longer	 sees	 two	of	 his	 own	 children,	 drives	
without	license	or	insurance	despite	convictions	for	dangerous	driving,	and	gets	angrily	abusive	






principles	 (Hollway	 and	 Jefferson	 2013).	 In	 what	 follows,	 I	 hope	 to	 show	 the	 following:	 the	
origins	of	Darren’s	characteristic	tendency	to	deploy	the	defence	of	splitting	good	from	bad;	the	
insecurity	of	his	 identifications	with	both	his	parents;	 the	 related	narcissistic	 tendencies;	 and	
the	relationship	of	these	to	his	(horrific,	as	we	shall	see)	partner	violence	and	his	tendency	to	
‘act	out’	and	behave	impulsively.	(For	reasons	of	space	I	will	not	be	exploring	his	use	of	violent	
racist	 language.)	 Since	 both	 his	 sexist	 violence	 and	 racist	 language	 are	 endemic	 rather	 than	
















‘disciplinary’	 side	 included	 a	 furious	 temper	 and,	 arguably	 rather	 ill‐disciplined,	 physical	
‘chastisement’.	 When	 Darren	 smashed	 up	 his	 step‐father’s	 car	 when	 his	 parents	 were	 on	
holiday,	 he	 decided	 to	move	 out	 because	 ‘if	 I	 was	 still	 there	when	 they	 got	 back	me	mother	
would	have	killed	me	there	and	then	…	swear	…	she’d	put	a	knife	in	me	neck	there	and	then	…	
you	 didn’t	 mess	 with	 me	 mother’.	 If	 that	 was	 an	 exaggeration,	 Darren	 had	 experienced	 her	
wrath	on	many	occasions:	‘I	got	scars	all	over	me	head	from	me	mum	and	me	sister’,	incidents	
which	included	being	thrown	along	a	wall	with	such	force	that	it	‘tore	the	back	of	me	head	open’,	
being	 hit	 on	 his	 eye	 by	 a	 record	 flung	 downstairs,	 being	 hit	 across	 the	 knuckles	 ‘with	 one	 of	
those	fold‐away	carpenter’s	rulers’,	being	hit	across	the	head	‘with	high	heels’,	being	‘cracked	…	
round	the	back	of	me	legs’	with	a	hockey	stick	with	such	force	that	it	‘took	both	me	legs,	yeah’.	
Characteristically,	 these	 punishments	 were	 justified	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 presumed	 disciplinary	
intent	 (‘she	 also	made	 sure	 I	 respected	me	 elders	 and	 I	 realised	 a	 lot	 of	 right	 from	wrong’),	





all	 the	 time.	 You’ll	 never	 get	 rid	 of	 that	 image.	 	 So	 I	 do	 understandably	…	hate	my	 biological	










them	 unpredictable	 carers,	 not	 to	 be	 messed	 with,	 not	 averse	 to	 dishing	 out	 physical	
punishments,	there	is	no	safe	emotional	space	in	which	to	develop.	The	consequence	is	likely	to	
be	 that	 the	 primitive	 paranoid‐schizoid	 defences	 of	 splitting	 and	 projective	 identification	
become	characteristic,	rather	than	just	occasional.	That	is	to	say,	Darren’s	mother	seems	to	have	
been	 too	 traumatised,	 preoccupied	 and	 generally	 overburdened	 to	 be	 a	 safe	 and	 reliable	
container	 for	Darren’s	 ‘bad’	 thoughts.	 And,	 despite	 his	 clear	 preference	 for	Darren,	 his	 father	




One	 consequence	 of	 this	 attenuated	 ability	 to	 achieve	 the	 depressive	 position	 was	 the	
development	 of	 Darren’s	 narcissistic	 tendencies	 (‘to	 annul	 the	 pain	 of	 disappointed	 [object]	
love’)	and	the	associated	defence	of	denial	or	disavowal.	Defensive	disavowal	is	evident	in	the	
following	account	of	his	father	beating	his	mother	and	of	Darren	knocking	him	unconscious	with	























were	 always	 fighting,	 screaming	 and	 arguing.	We’ve	 tried	 to	 beat	 each	 other	 black	 and	 blue’.	
And,	also	like	his	father	‘I	always	seem	to	get	the	better	of	her	even	though	she’s	like	three	times	
bigger	than	me’.		We	will	return	later	to	this	similarity.	For	the	moment,	note	the	normalisation	
(‘just	 typical	relationship’)	 that	effectively	removes	 its	horror,	and	the	accompanying	emotion	
or	 affect.	 	 In	 case	 you	 might	 be	 thinking	 otherwise,	 the	 violence	 involved	 was	 very	 serious	
indeed:	 ‘I’ve	broke	both	her	cheek	bones	on	separate	occasions;	I’ve	knocked	her	unconscious	
on	 another	 occasion.	 We’re	 forever	 fighting,	 I	 mean	 fighting,	 punching,	 strangling,	 kicking,	
throwing	 each	 other	 at	 walls,	 throwing	 stuff	 at	 each	 other’.	 Recounting	 this,	 though,	 he	







hit	me	once.	 I	retaliated.	 I	 just	punching	and	punching.	 I	 think	I	sent	about	four	
swings	in.	Half	way	on	the	fifth	one,	it	was	just	bang,	bang,	bang.	The	fifth	one,	it	




The	 fact	 that	 in	 the	 second	 interview	 he	 continues	 to	 rationalise	 his	 violence	 in	 terms	 of	
typicality	(‘Me	and	…	[her],	typical,	the	life	we	led.	We	are	forever	arguing’)	further	secures	the	
point:	generally	speaking,	or	most	of	 the	time,	 the	emotional	horror	of	violence	has	to	remain	
unacknowledged,	 denied,	 disavowed	 (despite	 it	 being	 the	 acknowledged	norm	of	his	 parents’	
relationship).	
	
Given	 a	mother	who	was	 unreliable	 as	 a	 container	 and	 a	 father	 too	 hated	 a	 figure	 for	 direct	
identification,	 at	 least	 two	 possibilities	 (not	 mutually	 exclusive,	 of	 course)	 follow	 from	 this,	
namely,	 ‘fragmentation’	 and	 ‘identification	 with	 the	 aggressor’.	 Darren’s	 interviews	 provided	
evidence	of	both.	When	an	attempt	at	projective	identification	is	resisted	by	the	person	who	is	
the	object	of	 the	projection	and	 there	 is,	 thus,	no	 ‘concomitant	 introjection’,	 attempts	become	
‘increasingly	forceful’	leading	to	‘severe	distortions	of	identity	and	the	disturbed	experiences	of	




over	or	 controlling	 the	other’s	 thoughts	 and	behaviour,	 forcing	 them	 to	 take	over	 the	hateful,	
bad	split	off	phantasies,	is	the	whole	(unconscious)	point	of	projective	identification.	As	Minsky	
(1998:	38)	nicely	puts	it,	 ‘the	people	onto	whom	these	projections	have	been	made	have	to	be	
severely	 controlled	because,	 like	human	psychical	dustbins,	 they	contain	 rejected	parts	of	 the	








lazy	 cow	 that	 sits	 on	 her	 fat	 arse	 and	 lets	 them	 do	whatever	 they	want’.	 By	 the	 time	 of	 the	
second	 interview,	 this	 had	 become	 so	 bad	 (‘I	 got	 screaming	 kids	 all	 the	 time	 …	 I’m	 just	
continually	losing	me	temper,	screaming,	shouting,	not	coping’)	that	he	was	thinking	of	moving	





method	of	dealing	with	his	 rising	 temper:	 ‘Get	away,	 escape,	walk	out,	 spend	a	bit	of	 time	on	
your	own,	go	down	the	fields,	sit	down	the	fields	for	10	minutes.	Just	calm	down’.	But,	‘then	she	
starts	 coming	with	 the	blockage	…	 “You’re	going	nowhere”	…	 [and]	 I	 just	 lost	 it’.	Although	he	
does	not	say	he	was	falling	apart	at	this	and	similar	points,	it	is	clear	that	his	inability	to	get	his	
own	 way,	 to	 force	 his	 partner	 (or	 her	 children)	 to	 accept	 his	 view	 of	 events	 (or,	 as	 I’m	










parent,	 as	 “he	 takes	 the	 unattackable	 authority	 into	 himself”.	 This	 is	what	Anna	 Freud	 called	
“identification	 with	 the	 aggressor”	 or	 with	 the	 aggressor’s	 aggression’	 (Young‐Bruehl	 1996:	
311).	 Although	 this	 identification	 with	 his	 father‘s	 violence	 was	 disavowed	 with	 the	
rationalisation	that	his	violence	was	about	something	(‘I’m	not	kicking	off	for	no	reason,	really’)	
whilst	 his	 father’s	was	 the	 pointless	 result	 of	 drink	 and	 his	 football	 team	 losing,	 Darren	was	









A	 less	 extreme	 version	 of	 fragmentation	 is	 the	 inability	 to	 think	 straight,	 to	 make	 simple	
connections:	what	Bion	calls	‘attacks	on	linking’.	There	is,	again,	much	evidence	of	this.	It	would	
seem	to	be	 implicated,	 for	example,	 in	Darren’s	account	of	him	and	a	 friend,	aged	around	ten,	
setting	light	to	a	disused	gypsy	caravan	the	two	them	had	been	using	as	a	‘base’,	an	act	of	bored	
messing	about	that	spread	to	two	vans	and	a	garage	to	cause	a	 ‘hell	of	a	 lot	of	damage’.	On	an	
impulse,	 they	destroyed	 their	hang	out,	and	all	 that	Darren	could	offer	by	way	of	 explanation	
was	boredom	and	the	non‐thought	that	‘it	was	just	something	that	happened’.	
	 	

















learned	 to	 drive	 but	 decided	 to	 take	 the	 car	 anyway.	 This	 led	 to	 a	 ‘Taking	Without	 Consent’	
(TWOC)	conviction	(‘Me	own	mother	had	me	for	TWOC’,	he	said,	with	some	surprise)	plus	fines	
and	 compensation	 payments.	 Later,	 after	 her	 death	 and	 his	 inheriting	 some	 money,	 he	 was	
hanging	around	with	‘guys	who	were	…	repairing	cars	and	that’	so	decided	to	buy	a	car:	‘I’ll	get	a	
car.	I’ll	learn	to	drive’.	But,	‘unfortunately	it	never	worked	like	that.	I	just	learnt	to	drive	and	just	
kept	 going.	 Never	 bothered	 to	 sit	 a	 test,	 never	 bothered	 to	 have	 a	 lesson’.	 Queried	 about	 the	
reason	 for	 his	 present	 probationary	 status,	 he	 said:	 ‘Driving	whilst	 disqualified.	 Never	 drunk	
driving,	 doesn’t	 happen,	 bit	 more	 sense	 than	 that’.	 But	 it’s	 an	 odd	 (or	 just	 a	 ruthlessly	 self‐
centred)	kind	of	sense	that	can	afford	a	car	but	does	not	bother	to	invest	the	much	smaller	sums	
needed	for	lessons,	licence	and	insurance,	especially	as	he	knows	that	‘if	I	did	have	an	accident	
and	I	was	to	 injure	somebody,	 I’m	knackered’.	However,	once	again,	 this	 logic	 is	countered	by	
the	 fact	 that	 ‘I’m	not	really	a	reckless,	dangerous	driver’	because	 ‘I	don’t	go	caning	 it	around’;	
nor	 does	 he	 drink‐drive:	 ‘no	 chance	 on	 this	 earth	 of	 that	 ever	 happening’.	 But	 he	 had	 had	 a	
‘bump’	that	he	would	not	talk	about	on	the	record,	and	a	crash	on	a	motorway,	one	which	could	
have	proved	fatal:	he	fell	asleep	in	the	‘fast	lane’	from	where	(he	was	later	told)	he	drifted	across	
lanes,	 ‘ploughed	 into	 the	 side	 of	 an	 artic,	 that’s	 bounced	 me	 straight	 back	 into	 the	 central	







pay	 the	 consequences	 in	 the	 end	 but	 at	 the	 time	 of	 doing	 it	…	 [everything]	 just	 goes	 out	 the	






I	 have	 already	 dealt	 with	 Darren’s	 use	 of	 the	 narcissistic	 defence	 of	 denial.	 The	 associated	
defence	of	omnipotence	supplies	the	phantasised	reality	that	replaces	the	denied	reality.	When	
this	is	challenged,	humiliation	is	keenly	felt.	Chodorow	links	this	with	the	Oedipal	process,	as	we	
saw	 in	 her	 earlier	 quotation:	 ‘humiliation,	 specifically,	 is	 especially	 a	 male‐male	 –	 originally	
father‐son	–	affair’	…	[involving]	the	delicate	negotiation	…	of	identification	…	without	bringing	
on	retaliation,	castration,	or	humiliation’.	In	other	words,	she	is	arguing,	those	males	for	whom	
the	 process	 (of	 giving	 up	 one’s	 first	 love	 attachment	 to	 the	 mother,	 and	 with	 it	 the	
accompanying	narcissistic	sense	of	omnipotence,	in	favour	of	an	identification	with	their	father)	
has	 not	 been	well	 handled	may	 become	 sensitive	 to	 humiliation	 by	 other	males.	 This	 would	
seem	 to	 be	 especially	 the	 case	 for	 those	males	 having	 continuing	 problems	with	 narcissistic	
phantasies	of	omnipotence.	There	were	at	least	two	examples	of	Darren’s	enraged	responses	to	
other	males	 that	 seem	 indicative	of	Darren	perceiving	 threats	 to	his	 omnipotent	 sense	of	 self	
and	attempting	to	ward	off	humiliation.		
	









to	 Darren’s	 sister,	 asking	 ‘He’s	 your	 brother‐in‐law?’	 Darren	 became	 ‘frighteningly	 enraged’	
(DG’s	notes)	and	 told	DG	not	 to	use	 that	 term.	When	DG	 tried	 ‘your	 sister’s	husband’	 instead,	
Darren	replied	‘Me	sister’s	fuck	up	[DG:	OK].	Please	do	not	use	that	phrase	for	him.	No	way	is	he	
anything	 to	do	with	me,	no	way’.	 	There	were	 two	attempts	at	 ejection:	on	 the	 first	occasion,	
Darren	 had	 been	 punched	 and	 threatened	 with	 a	 knife;	 on	 the	 second,	 he	 had	 been	 in	 the	
process	 of	 packing	his	bags	 (apparently	without	 demur,	 but	 plainly	 a	humiliating	 experience:	
‘couldn’t	 do	 it	 on	 his	 own’;	 ‘both	 times	…	 he’s	 come	 up	with	 friends	 [with]	…	 baseball	 bats’)	










clue’.	 Not	 having	 a	 clue	 seemed	 to	 relate	 to	 the	 (male)	 ‘copper’	 being	unable	 (or	 refusing)	 to	




the	 problem	 (‘couldn’t	 see	 where	 I	 was	 coming	 from’)	 proved	 humiliating,	 prompting	 this	
outburst	of	recalled	rage.	He	ends	the	story	with	a	remark	that	is	Darren’s	attempt	to	turn	the	
tables	 and	 humiliate	 the	 ‘copper’,	 by	 feminising	 him:	 ‘Never	 mind	 the	 tit	 on	 your	 head	 [a	
reference	to	his	helmet,	presumably],	 I	 think	you	got	a	 tit	on	your	 flaming	face	you	tool’.	This	
double	 insult,	 implicating	 the	 male	 organ,	 ‘tool’,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 female	 ‘tit’,	 provides	 further	








desires’	 and	 that	 psychoanalysis	 is	 the	 key	 to	 understanding	 these.	 Using	 a	 combination	 of	




situations.	 With	 parents	 too	 unreliable	 as	 containers	 or	 points	 of	 identification,	 paranoid	
splitting	 of	 the	 world	 into	 good	 and	 bad	 is	 the	 result,	 as	 is	 the	 replacement	 of	 anxiety	 by	
aggression.	Examples	of	this	paranoid	world‐view	were	taken	from	many	parts	of	the	interviews	
with	Darren.	Such	a	fragile	sense	of	identity,	constantly	depleted	through	projecting	out	parts	of	
the	 self,	 is	 vulnerable	 to	 the	 narcissism	 resulting	 from	 experiences	 of	 rejection,	 and	 the	
associated	defences	of	denial	or	disavowal	and	omnipotence.	Although	there	were	other	general	
examples,	 just	two	instances	of	Darren’s	omnipotent	thinking	and	behaviour	were	used:	those	
relating	 to	 other	 males;	 along	 with	 material	 demonstrating	 the	 related	 characteristics	 of	
impulsive	 behaviour	 and	 ‘acting	 out’.	 The	 most	 glaring	 example	 of	 Darren’s	 hatred,	 the	 one	






his	 failure	 to	 get	 his	 partner	 to	 see	 things	 from	his	 point	 of	 view:	 to	 take	 in,	 or	 introject,	 his	
hostile	 projective	 identifications.	 There	 was	 also	 evidence	 of	 Darren	 ‘identifying	 with	 the	
aggressor’,	his	violent	father,	in	these	incidents;	of	becoming,	despite	himself,	the	man	he	hated.		
	
I	 end	 with	 some	 riders	 and	 a	 pointer	 towards	 the	 social.	 First,	 a	 reminder	 that	 the	
developmental	processes	that	I	have	been	alluding	to	are	universal	ones:	they	affect	us	all	and	
we	all	end	up	somewhere	on	the	relevant	continua.	Take,	for	example,	narcissism.	Learning	to	
love	 ourselves	 is	 a	 necessary	 part	 of	 normal	 development,	 and	 most	 of	 us	 have	 ‘narcissistic	
traits’.	 But	 it	 is	 developmentally	 contingent	 whether	 we	 become	 ‘narcissistic	 characters’,	
develop	 ‘narcissistic	 character	 disorders’,	 become	 ‘narcissistic	 neurotics’	 or,	 finally,	
‘schizophrenics’,	 to	 use	 the	 continuum	 of	 narcissism	 from	 normal	 to	 pathological	 offered	 by	
Young‐Bruehl	(1996:	207).	The	same	with	learning	to	hate:	it	exists	on	a	similar	continuum	and,	
as	 I	 have	 been	 trying	 to	 do	 here,	 we	 need	 constantly	 to	 improve	 our	 understanding	 of	 its	
developmental	pathways.	Second,	although	I	have	been	drawing	on	the	work	of	Young‐Bruehl	
(1996)	 who	 operates	 with	 the	 notion	 of	 character	 types,	 I	 have	 resisted	 using	 it	 in	 my	
presentation,	 preferring	 instead	 the	 less	 fixed	notion	 of	 characteristic	defences.	 This	 is	 partly	
because	 the	 idea	 of	 character	 (like	 personality)	 does	 not	 convey	 the	 incessant	 dynamics	
underpinning	behaviour	for	which	a	processual	analysis	is	more	appropriate.	Moreover,	using	‘a	
type’	 in	 the	detailed	examination	of	any	particular	person	(as	here)	 tends	to	produce	a	mixed	
type.	But	it	is	also	in	full	recognition	that,	with	the	limited	information	available,	talking	in	terms	





Finally,	what	 about	 the	 social?	Here,	Young‐Bruehl’s	 argument	 that	 ‘characterologically	based	
prejudice	types	and	types	of	societies,	reflect	and	promote,	or	refuse	and	demote,	the	different	
prejudices’	 (Young‐Bruehl	1996:	 27)	 is	 a	useful	 starting	point.	What	 it	means,	 very	 simply,	 is	
that	particular	types	of	prejudice	will	flourish	in	societies	where	the	associated	character	types	
are	 enabled	 in	 some	 ways.	 Take	 Darren’s	 sexist	 violence.	 Formally	 this	 is	 disapproved	 of,	
discouraged	 and	 may	 even	 be	 criminalised.	 In	 practice,	 little	 is	 done	 to	 stop	 it	 and	 it	 is,	
informally,	massively	condoned.	Take	the	time	when	Darren,	feeling	he	had	become	his	father,	




happened	with	his	mother.	Despite	 all	 the	beatings,	 she	 reunited	with	Darren’s	 father	 after	 a	
period	of	separation,	 thus	proving	 to	Darren,	 that	 ‘they	realised	 there	was	still	 feelings	there’.	
These	 are	 concrete,	 everyday	 examples	 of	 a	 society	 ‘reflecting	 and	 promoting’	 sexism:	
institutionally	 and	 discursively.	 Beyond	 that,	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 police	 and	 the	 courts	 to	 deal	
effectively	 with	 ‘domestic	 violence’	 is,	 unfortunately,	 the	 kind	 of	 criminological	 truism	 and	






Correspondence:	 Tony	 Jefferson,	 Emeritus	 Professor	 of	 Criminology,	 Keele	 University,	











Benjamin	 J	 (1998)	 Shadow	 of	 the	 Other:	 Intersubjectivity	 and	 Gender	 in	 Psychoanalysis.	 New	
Haven,	Connecticut:	Yale	University	Press.	
Chodorow	 NJ	 (2012)	 Individualizing	 Gender	 and	 Sexuality:	 Theory	 and	 Practice.	 New	 York:	
Routledge.	
Freeman	T	 (1963)	The	 concept	 of	 narcissism	 in	 schizophrenic	 states.	 International	 Journal	of	
Psychoanalysis	44:	293‐303.	
Freud	S	(1905)	Three	essays	on	 the	 theory	of	sexuality.	 In	Richards	A	 (ed.)	The	Pelican	Freud	
Library	Volume	7,	On	Sexuality.	Harmondsworth:	Penguin,	1977:	31‐169.	
Freud	S	 (1914)	On	narcissism:	An	 introduction.	 In	Richards	A	 (ed.)	The	Pelican	Freud	Library	




Gadd	 D,	 Dixon	 B	 and	 Jefferson	 T	 (2005)	Why	 Do	 They	 Do	 It?	 Racial	 Harassment	 in	 North	
Staffordshire.	Keele:	Centre	for	Criminological	Research,	Keele	University.	
Gadd	D	and	Jefferson	T	(2007)	Psychosocial	Criminology.	London:	Sage.	




Jefferson	 T	 (forthcoming)	 Racial	 hatred	 and	 racial	 prejudice:	 A	 difference	 which	 makes	 a	






Young‐Bruehl	 E	 (1996)	 The	 Anatomy	 of	 Prejudices.	 Cambridge:	 Massachusetts:	 Harvard	
University	Press,	1998.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
